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Applications  of general  equiiibrium  mnodels  todifferent problems
arising in tax policy -such  as identifying  desirable tax bases in
Bangladesh, analyzing price controls in China, andcoordinating
tax-cum-tariff reform in India  - show how useful they can be in
supplementing more qualitative  judgments. But they are useful
only if substantial effort is devoted to establishing a consistent  - !
data set and to choosing the structure of the model in a way that  V..
makes its behaviorconsistenit  with what goodeconomic analysis  E
would suggest.
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While general principles can guide the design of  examine the desirability of recommending broad
the overall contours of a tax reform package,  uniformity of tax rates among sectors.  Such
models for tax policy analysis can complement  uniformity may yield acceptable outcomes in
analysts' judgments in important and replicable  market-based economies, but the model shows
ways. Dahl and Mlitra  show their usefulness  that losses from uniform taxation can be very
with three examples.  significant in a decentralizing socialist economy
- where some production is centrally planned
They use a tax policy model fer Bangladesh  and subject to price controls and some is subject
to show how one can analyze the revenue and  to decentralized decision-making and transacted
incidence effects of a tax reform proposal of the  at market prices.
kind that arises in country economic work. For
each sector of the economy, the model is asked:  Their third example, drawn from an ongoing
how much must an ad valorem excise tax be  study in India, shows how two models - one
raised in that sector to getnerate  an additional one  sectorally disaggregated but macroeconomically
percent of total indirect tax revenue? The results  simple, the other macroeconomically richer but
show how the burden of tax increases in each  sectorally aggregated -can  be implemented on
sector is distributed across different rural and  a common data base to help study the coordi-
urban socioeconomic groups and how it affects  nated reformn  of tariffs and indirect taxes. The
such variables as the consumer price index and  combined models can be used to calculate how
the trade deficit.  Since each sector is asked to  much indirect taxes must be increased, after a
contribute the sanie amount of revenue, the  reduction in tariffs undertaken to promote an
results can be compared across sectors to show  outward-oriented development strategy, to
which of them are better candidates for increased  produce enough revenue for the govemment to
taxation in an overall reform package.  meet its expenditures without changing the
current account deficit.
The revenue and incidence effects are then
combined in a single measure that allows one to  Finally, Dahl and Mitra discuss the costs of
rank the sectors by the efficiency-cum-equity  constructing general equilibrium models for tax
cost of raising revenue. Those rankings are used  policy analysis - and implications for data
to compare traditional with general-equilibrium-  requirements and judgments about modeling
based approaches to incidence analysis, a  stritegy.  The most effort must be devoted to (I)
comparison that underlines the importance of  establishing a consistent data set and (2) calibrat- -
assumptions about the labor market and about  ing the model in a way that allows its behavior to
substitutability in production in formulating tax  be consistent wiLh  what good economic analysis
policy proposals.  would Iead one to cxpect.  These costs must be
set against the benefits of the modeling approach
In their second example, Dahl and Mitra use  to tax policy analysis in developing countries.
a tax policy model based on data from China to
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SUMMARY
General principles can guide the design of the overall contours of
a tax reform package to a considerable extent.  Quantitative analysis, or a
model, can however provide a useful supplement when  it  comes to examining
specific proposals with respect to the two important dimensions of applied
tax analysis, viz., revenue estimation and tax incidence.  This paper draws
attention to some of the ways  in which tax policy models developed by PRE's
Public Economics Division in the course of country economic work have been
used to shed light on these questions.
The first part of the paper uses a tax policy model for Bangladesh
to illustrate how the revenue and incidence effects of a tax reform proposal
of the kind that can arise in country economic work may be analyzed.  To
that end the  model is asked the question:  what is the necessary increase in
ad valorem excise taxes on a particular sector that will raise an additional
1 percent of total indirect tax revenue?  This is done for each sector of
the economy.  Results are presented as to how the burden of tax increas2s in
each sector is distributed across different rural and urban socio-economic
groups and the impact on such variables as the consumer price index and the
trade deficit.  Since each sector is examined from the point of view of its
effectiveness in contributing the same amount of revenue, the above results
can be compared across sectors to allow a judgment to be made as to which of
them  are  better  candidates  for  increased  taxation in an  overall  reform
package.The revextue  and incidence effects noted above are then combined and
summarized in a single measure that allows different sectors to be ranked
with  respect to the efficiency-cum-equity cost of raising revenue.  These
rankings are used to compare traditional versus general equilibrium based
approaches to incidence analysis.  This is done by ascertaining that would
happen  to  the  rankings  first  if, as  is  common  in partial  equilibrium
incidence analysis, it  were assumed that all tax increases are fully forward
shifted into user prices, and if second, as is sometimes the case in partial
equilibrium  analysis,  it were  assumed  that all  tax increases are  fully
backward shifted into factor returns.  Incidence judgments are more heavily
influenced in the first case by the characteristics of the socio-economic
groups that consume the product on which the tax is to be increased and in
the second case by the characteristics of those employed in its production.
The change in the rankings in the three cases:  full forward shifting, full
backward shifting and the "central" case of a combination of  forward and
backward  shifting  of  taxes  is  considerable  and  highlights  the  critical
importance of labor market specifications and substitutability assumptions
in production in arriving at judgments about tax policy proposals.
The second part of the paper uses a tax policy model based on data
from China to examine the desirability of recommending broad uniformity of
tax rates over a large number of sectors.  While such a rule of thumb leads
to  generally  acceptable  outcomes  in market-based economies,  it requires
substantial re-examination in decentralizing socialist economies, such as
China,  where  some production  is centrally planned, and  subject  to price
controls,  a d  some  is  subject  to  decentralized  decision-making  and
transacted  at market  prices.  The  planning authorities allocate certain
inputs to enterprises and require the delivery of certain outputs; these
transactions occur at controlled prices.  However, enterprises may sell any-3-
additional output  (above that  required by  the plan)  as well  as purchase
additional  inputs  (above those  allocated by  the plan)  at market  prices.
Taxes  on  controlled price  sales have  to be  borne by  the  enterprise and
reduce investment, welfare  facilities and bonuses.  In contrast, taxes on
free  market  sales  can  be  passed  on  to  the  consumer  and  only harm  the
enterprise  through  a  reduction  in  the  demand  for  its  output.  The
coexistence  of  forward  shifting  of  taxes  on market  sales  and  bacio.'ard
shifting on price-controlled sales makes significant non-uniformity uf tax
rates  desirable; this  is because, with  price controls, backward shifting
would cause uniform tax rates to lead to highly unequal profitability and
workers' bonuses across sectors.  The China model is used to show that the
losses from uniform taxation can increase rapidly with the extent of price
controls.  These  losses are much  larger than those computed in economies
without such controls.  This implies that while simplification of rates is
desirable on  administrative grounds and to reduce opportunities for  rent
seeking, a unification of value added tax rates is not appropriate in the
presence of price controls.  The exercise may also be seen as providing a
strong argument for price reforms.
The third part of the paper, drawn from an ongoing study on India,
pertains  to the coordinated reform of tariffs and indirect taxes.  Trade
liberalization,  recommended  ia  the  interests  of  promoting  an  outward-
oriented  development  strategy, can,  in the absence  of offsetting  fiscal
measures, have negative consequences for revenue and, hence, macroeconomic
stability.  Tracing the consequences of tariff reductions on macroeconomic
aggregates requires an aggregated  model capable of incorporating economywide
linkages.  On  the other hand,  the language of tariff reform  analysis is
disaggregated and requires that the effects of policy changes be quantified
in sectoral detail.  These objectives are reconciled by  implementing two- 4 -
models  on a common  data ba  : (i)  a sectorally  disaggregated  version  that
makes simple  assumptions  regarding  certain  macroeconomic  relationships  and
(ii) an aggregated  version that makes more appropriate  assumptions  about"
those  relationships  and suggests  what correction  ought  therefore  to be made
to the  results  of the  sectorally  detailed  analysis. The approach  is  used  to
illustrate  by how much indirect  taxes need on average to be increased
following a reduction in protective  customs  dtties,  so as to allow the
government to meet its expenditures  without any change in the current
account  deficit.
Finally, the paper discusses the costs of constructing  general
equilibrium  models  for  tax policy  analysis with  reference to data
requirements, demands on compLting and judgements regarding  modelling
strategy. It is  argued  that  establishing  a consistent  data  set  is  among  the
costlier  elements  of modelling  and  that computing  and software  requirements
are  inexpensive by comparison.  It is relatively straightfozward to
implement  a model and to run policy  simulations  once the data base has
become available.  Considerations  such as these  must be set against  the
ability  of models  to complement  the analyst's  judgment  and the gains  made
possible  in terms  of consistency  of the  recommendations  and  their  potential
for  repliuation. To this  must  be added  the fact  that  the  models  can  yield
"economywide"  parameters,  for  example,  estimates  of the  distortionary  costs
of the tax system, that are an useful input into sectoral  and project
decision-making  outside  the immediate  context  of tax  policy.  The various
arguments  are brought  together  to allow  the  reader  to assess  the costs  and
benefits of the modelling  approach  to tax policy analysis  in developing
countries.APPLYING  TAX  POLICY  MO'PELS  IN  COUNTRY  ECONOMIC  WORK:
BANGLADESH,  CHINA, INDIA
I.  INTRODUCTION
General  principles  can  guide  the  design  of the  overall  contours  of
a tax reform  package  to a considerable  extent. Thus, it  is customary  to
recommend,  for example,  that  the  value  added  tax  form the  mainstay  of the
indirect  tax system,  that it  apply  to as large  a part of the economy  as
administrative  constraints  permit,  that  it exempt  nonmarketed  food  consumed
by the poor and be supplemented  by a luxury  rate or excises  on selected
luxury  items  and  on those  goods  whose  consumption  the  government  wishes  to
discourage. Turning  to company  taxation,  the  emphasis  is on broadening  of
the  base  and  neutral  treatment  of different  secto-q  and  alternative  sources
of investment  finance. And the  reform  of personal  income  taxes  focuses  on
the  need  for an exemption  level that is consistent  with administrative
capacity,  a small  number  of tax  rates  and  elimination  o.  ecial  incentives
that typically  lose revenue  rather  than fttrther  the objectives  that are
described  as justifying  their  existence.
While  a number  of developing  countries  have  undertaken  significant
tax reform to varying degrees, the more usual situation  is one where
consideration  is being  given  to changing  certain  taxes  and their  rates  as
part of budget  making  or planning  exercises. In such situations,  policy
makers  are interested  in ascertaining  the impact of the proposals on
revenue  and  the  way  in  which  they  would  affect  different  socioeconomic
groups. General  principles  alone  are  of limited  use in such cases  and it
becomes necessary to undertake  some quantitative  analysis.  This paper-6-
reports on the use  of three tax policy  models developed  by the Public
Economics Divioion of the Policy Research and External Affairs (PRE)
Complex  of the  World Bank to analyze  this  set of issues  in the  course  of
undertaking  economic  work with the regional departments  in the Bank's
Operational  Complex. The  first  model,  that  for  Bangladesh  (Section  II),  is
used to demonstrate  how the relative  attractiveness  of different  revenue-
raising  options  depends  sensitively  on the  workings  of labor  markets  and
substitution  relationships  in production,  matters  regarding which
conventional  partial  equilibrium  incidence  analysis  makes  strong
assumptions. The second  model,  that for  China (Section  III),  emphasizes
the importance  of taking  a systemwide  view of taxation  in a decentralizing
socialist  economy,  where the coexistence  of administered  and free market
prices  for  the same  commodities  can  make standard  tax  reform  prescriptions
most inappropriate.  The  exercise  highlights  some  of the  links  between  tax
reform  and  price reform. The  third  model,  drawn  from  an ongoing  study  on
India (Section  IV), examines  the kinds of domestic  tax adjustments  that
would  be necessary  in the  wake of  reductions  in import  tariffs  in order  to
allow  the government  to continue  to  meet its  real  expenditures  without  any
change  in foreign  borrowing,  but taking  into  account  changes  in the  prices
of intermediates  and  capital  goods  resulting  from  the  tariff  reform.
Section  V  of  the  paper  discusses  the  costs  involved  in
constructing  and implementing  tax policy  models, sets them against the
insights  into policy  made available  by using  models  and p:  ovides  a brief




This section highlights the role of sbifting assumptions in
production  and  the  operation  of factor  markets  in inf'uencing  the  choice  of
sectors that should be additionally  taxed to raise a given amount of
government  revenve.  The illustrations  focus  on excise  taxation,  a brief
account  of  the  characteristics  of  which 'ollows.i
Attempts  to reduce  the economy's  dependence  on trade  taxes  which
contribute  over  50%  of tax  revenue  have  promoted  increasing  reliance  on the
excise  tax  which  accounts  for  97  percent  of taxes  on domestic  production  in
Bangladesh.  This is a turnover  tax that is levied  ex factory  on domestic
production  and also  on some  services,  and  whose  effects  cascade  throughout
the whole economy.  In recent  years excise  taxes have accounted  for 23
percent  of tax  revenue. While  the  average  rate  of excise  tixation,  defined
as the ratio  of collections  to the  gross  value  of excisable  production  is
around 8 percent,  two-thirds  of excise  tax revenue is accounted  for by
three categories  of goods,  viz., tobacco,  gas and petroleum-cum-oil-cum-
lubricants.
Raising  One  Percent  of  Indirect  Tax  Revense
As with any tax reform,  a proposed  change  in excise  taxation  has
two effects that are of interest  to analysts  and policy  makers:  (i)
revenue and (ii) incidence across different socioeconomic  groups.  To
isolate  those  effects,  the  Bangladesh  tax  policy  model,  which  distinguishes
35 production  sectors  and 10 socioeconomic  groups,  is asked  the question:
1/  A  similar analysis with respect to other taxes in Bangladesh is
contained  in Dahl and  Mitra (1989)  to which  the  reader  is referred  for
a  fuller  description.-8-
what  is the necessary  increase in ad valorem excise taxation of a glven
sector  which  will  raise  an  additional 1 percent  of total  indirect tax
revenue (or Tk 230 million at 1984/85 prices) with government expenditure
requirements  (i.e., public  consumption and  investment) held  fixed?  The
experiment is done for every sector and the efficiency and distributional
effects of the changes examined.
Two points about  these !~xperittents  deserve comment.  First,  to
raise an additional 1 per2ent in total requires raising more than an extra
Tk 230 million  from the sector in question alone.  This  is because the
direct and cascading-induced  increases in  market prices lead to a reduction
in the level of activity, imports and hence import tax receipts that are
not offset by the government disposition of the additional tax revenue; we
shall  return  to  this  last  point  later.  Second,  the  demand  for  an
additional 1  percent of total indirect tax revenue at constant prices means
that  the  results  can  be  compared  across  sectors:  in  all  cases,  the
government  drain  on  the  economy  is the  same.  Thus,  if  the  required
increase of the excise tax rate is 1  percentage point 4.n  one sector, and 10
percentage points in another, it is immediately clear that the first sector
is more readily able to raise revenue. It need not be the more preferable
instrument,  however,  because  its  inherent  welfare  cost  or  its
distributional consequences may be unde,. sable. The results are summarized
in Table 1.
Column (1) shows the percentage increase in the ad valorem excise
tax rate that will  raise indirect tax revenue by  1 percent.  Column  (2)
shows the resulting change in the consumer price index.  Column (3)  records
the movement in the trade gap induced 'oy  the effect of excise taxation on
imports  and  exports.  Increases  in  tax  rates  transfer  income  from  the
private sector to the government  which, with fixed public expenditure, has-9-
Table 1.  Bangladeshi Hacroeconomic  Effects  of Raising  One Percent  of Real
Revenue  by Different  Excise  Taxes
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Relative  Relative  Relative  Relative  Relative
Increase  in  Increase  in  Increase  in  Increase  in  Increase  in  Relarive
Excise  Tax  Consumer  Trade  Excise  Tax  CDST  Distribution Loss  of
Rate  Prices  Deficit  Revenue  Revenue  Effect  SWF
(Pct.)  (Pct.)  (Pct.)  (Pct.)  (Pct.)  (Sign)  (Pct.)
Rice  0.18  -0.17  -0.39  3.31  -0.02  - 2.35
Wheat  2.73  -0.08  -0.37  3.31  -0.03  2.06
Jute  4.10  -0.95  -0.76  3.38  -0.05  - 4.79
Cotton  7.02  -0.14  -0.23  3.55  -0.13  7/-  1.38
Tea  16.57  -0.05  -0.11  3.27  -0.01  ?1-  0.57
Other  Crops  0.61  -0.19  -0.40  3.37  -0.05  2/-  2.25
Livestock  1.84  -0.20  -0.41  3.32  -0.03  7/-  2.19
Fisheries  0.99  0.17  -0.38  3.31  -0.03  7/-  2.11
Forestry  2.72  -0.06  -0.13  3.38  -0.06  0  0.66
Sugar  3.50  -0.09  -0.26  3.53  -0.12  0/-  1.44
Edible  Oil  2.82  -0.11  -0.36  3.41  -0.07  0/-  2.00
Tobacco  7.27  -0.10  -0.36  3.32  -0.03  0/-  2.41
Cther  Food  3.14  -0.15  -0.37  3.35  -0.04  0/-  1.77
Cocton  Yarn  3.90  -0.24  -0.42  3.64  -0.17  0/-  2.45
Cloth  1.11  -0.10  -0.32  3.41  -0.07  0/-  1.87
Jute  Textiles  2.04  -0.01  -0.03  3.26  -0.00  +  0.13
Paper  8.08  -0.16  -0.27  3.55  -0.13  0/-  1.51
Leather  2.91  -0.18  -0.33  3.31  -0.03  0/+  1.93
Fertilizer  2.98  -0.13  -0.38  3.33  -0.03  7  2.07
Pharm.  &  Chemicals  2.28  -0.12  -0.32  3.54  -0.13  0/-  1.68
Cement  11.13  0.03  0.01  3.47  -0.10  +  -0.03
Basic  Mct ls  1.85  0.01  0.01  3.73  -0.21  +  0.03
Metal  Products  1.20  -0.01  -0.05  3.30  -'.02  0  0.23
Wood/-':her  Ind.  1.32  -0.06  -0.17  3.47  -0.10  0/-  0.84
Urban-HBldg.  8.78  -0.01  -0.04  3.27  -0.01  0  0.19
Rural-HBldg.  3.45  -0.00  -0.01  3.26  -1.00  0  0.07
Other  Constr.  1.40  -0.01  -0.02  3.26  -0.00  0  0.09
Petroleum  0.48  -0.13  -0.35  3.41  -0.07  0/-  1.85
Electricity/Gas  3.32  -0.13  -0.20  3.39  -0.06  0/-  1.16
Tranap.  Services  1.11  -0.19  -0.37  3.40  -0.06  0/-  2.05
Pousing  2.14  -0.16  -a.36  3.30  -0.02  0/-  2.02
Health  6.51  -0.07  -0.26  3.31  -0.03  - 0.88
Education  3.29  -0.04  -0.12  3.27  -0.01  0  0.46
Public  Admn.  1.35  -0.01  -0.02  3.27  -0.01  0  0.11
Trade  & Other  0.30  -0.20  -0.38  3.44  -0.08  - 2.03- 10  -
a contractionary imr  :t, resulting in a fall in the consumer price index
rAd  an improvement in the trade deficit.  Columns (4) and (5) report the
resulting changes in excise revenue and revenue from customs duties  and
sales taxes (CDST)  on imports respectively.
The relative real ir.comes  in the base year of the model (1984/85)
of the socioeconomic groups identified by the Household Expenditure Survey
a-.e  shown  in  Table  2.  The  numbers  are  presented  as  ratios  to  the
economywide average,  where the latter is  weighted by the population in each
group.  The distributional impact of the excise tax changes of Table 1 are
shown in detail in Table 3 which reports the impact on real income, i.e.,
income deflated by the consumer price index, for each socioeconomic group.
An informal examination of those numbers is used to generate Column (6) of
Table  1.  Thus  a  plus  (+) means  progressive,  zero  (0)  indicates
neutrality, whereas a minus (-)  indicates regressive incidence.  A question
mark (?)  signifies that the outcome is unclear.  While this information can
(and  will) be more formally presented, the detailed results of Table 3 are
frequently  of  considerable  interest  to  analysts  and  policy  makers  in
identifying  the main  elements of  a  tax package.  Such  a package,  once
identified,  can  then  be  simulated using  the model  and  its revenue  and
incidence impact examined in detail.  Colum-n  (7),  which may be disregarded
Table 2.  Bangladesh:  Base Per Capita Relative Real Income by
Socioeconomic Group (Relative  to Weighted Average Across Groups)
Landless Rural  0.915
Small Farmers  1.018
Medium Farmers (Tenants)  1.015
Medium Farmers (Owners)  1.079
Large Farmers  1.109
Largest Farmers  1.204
Rural Informal Sector  0.903
Rural Formal Sector  1.097
Urban Informal Sector  0.766
Urban Formal Sector  1.064- 11  -
for the moment, reports the change in social  welfare resulting from the tax
change, using a social  welfare function introduced later in this section.
Tables  1 and  3  show  that  a  number  of  excise  taxes  feature
desirable properties:  they are effective at raising revenue, have little
effect on the trade balance and may  even exhibit progressive  incidence.
This is true, most notably, of the basic metals  sector.  The table also
shows, for example, that while jute textiles is a satisfactory tax base,
this is not the case for jute.  This is mainly because, in contrast with
jute textiles, jute is an intensive employer of the rural landless.  It is
also because jute is a smaller sector, so that a larger tax increase is
necessary to raise the same revenue.
Underlying Assumptions of the Model
The  tax  policy  model  used  for  the  above  analysis  makes  the
following assumptions. 2 First, household preferences are modelled using a
linear expenditure system for each socioeconomic group.  Second, supplies
of primary factors are modelled as follows.  In each of the urban and rural
areas, supplies of primary factors  are isoelastic in the real  wage rate for
all  classes,  except  one.  Members  of  the  remaining  class, termed  the
residual class (the landless in the rural area, the informal sector in the
urban area) migrate freely into and out of other classes in the same area,
thus providing a pool of labor which adjusts to demands for other types of
primary inputs.  When demands for other classes of factors increase, the
residual class accommodates this demand pressure, thus reducing the supply
2/  A more formal statement is contained in Dahl and Mitra (1989).- 12  -
Table  3.  Bangladesh: Per  Capita  Real Income  Effects  of Raising  One Percent  of
Real  Revenue  by Different  Excise  Taxes
Effects  by Socioeconomic  Class
Class
Medium  Medium  Rural  Rural  Urban  Urban
Small  Farmers  Farmers  Large  Largest  Informal  Formal  Informal  Formal
Sector  Landless  Farmers  Tenants  Ovners  Farmers  Farmers  Sector  Sector  Sector  Sector
Rice  -0.43  -0.08  -0.09  -0.10  -0.10  -0.11  -0.05  -0.04  0.22  0.02
Wheat  -0.36  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.05  -0.04  0.11  0.00
Jute  -0.88  -0.19  -0.15  -0.15  -0.14  -0.13  -0.01  -0.05  -0.04  0.05
Cotton  -0.25  -0.05  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.06  -0.05  -0.03  0.19  0.02
Tea  -0.11  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  0.06  0.01
Other  Crops  -0.43  -0.08  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.06  -0.05  0.25  0.03
Livesrock  -0.42  -0.09  -0.11  -0.11  -0.10  -0.09  -0.08  -0.05  0.23  0.01
Fisheries  -0.41  -0.07  -0.10  -0.09  -0.10  -0.10  -0.09  -0.07  0.23  0.03
Forestry  -0.14  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.05  0.09  0.01
Sugar  -0.29  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.04  0.03  0.12  0.01
Edible  Oil  -0.37  -0.07  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.10  -0.05  -0.04  0.16  0.01
Tobacco  -0.44  -0.09  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.06  -0.04  0.14  0.01
Other  Food  -0.38  -0.08  -0.10  -0.11  -0.10  -0.10  -0.04  -0.03  0.20  0.02
Cotton  Yarn  -0.42  -0.09  -0.12  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.09  -0.06  0.21  0.01
Cloth  -0.31  -0.05  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.10  -0.03  0.08  0.00
Jute  Textiles  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  0.01  0.00
Paper  -0.31  -0.0',  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.07  -0.06  -C.03  0.20  0.01
Leather  -0.33  -0.07  -0.09  -0.09  -0.08  -0.08  -0.06  -0.04  0.19  -0.03
Fertilizer  -0.35  -0.07  -0.10  -0.09  -0.09  -0.08  -0.08  -0.06  0.11  -0.02
Pharm.  &  Chemicals  -0.33  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.07  -0.07  -0.03  0.15  0.01
Cement  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.03  -0.01  0.03  -0.01
Basic  Metals  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.02
Metal  Products  -0.05  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  -0.00
Wood/Other  Ind.  -0.18  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  0.08  0.00
Urban  House  Bldg.  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00
Rural  House  Bldg.  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00
Other  Construct.  -0.02  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.01  0.00
Petroleum  -0.36  -0.07  -0.09  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.06  -0.04  0.17  0.01
Electricity/Gas  -0.23  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  0.11  0.02
Transp.  Se.vices  -0.38  -0.08  -0.11  -0.10  -0.09  -0.08  -0.07  -0.04  0.20  0.01
Housing  -0.38  -0.07  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.10  -0.06  -0.05  0.19  0.02
Health  -0.19  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.05  -0.08  -0.11  -0.03
Education  -0.08  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  -0.08  -0.02
Public  Adminis.  -0.02  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.01  0.00
Trade  & Other  -0.38  -0.08  -0.11  -0.10  -0.10  -0.09  -0.07  -0.05  0.20  0.01- 13 -
of  landless  or  urban  informals.  When  the  demands  for  other  factors
decreases, the numbers in the residual class  increase. 3 Wben members of
the residual household class migrate to other classes they are assumed to
adopt the spending habits of their new class.  Third, the primary factor
inputs of  each  of the  socioeconomic groups are aggregated  (using a  CES
function) into value added in each sector. 4 Fourth, output is a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate of intermediate inputs and value added.
These  assumptions  imply  in general  that  a  tax  increase  on  a
commodity, for example of the type considered in Table 1, would in part be
shifted forward into increased prices paid by users of the commodity and in
part be shifted backward i.nto  depressed returns to factors employed in its
production.  The  degree of  shifting is endogenous and determined, inter
alia, by the relevant supply and demand elasticities for the commodity.
In contrast, it has been common in partial equilibrium work  on
developing  country  tax  incidence  to  assume  either  (i)  full  forward
shifting,  where  commodity  taxes  are  fully reflected  in changes  in  the
corresponding consumer prices, with producer prices remaining constant,5 or
(ii) full backward shifting, where, for example, domestic commodity prices
are anchored by world prices, corrected for trade taxes and subsidies, so
that changes in those taxes are reflected in returns to factors employed in
those  sectors.6 It  is  clear  that  the  desirability  of  particular tax
3/  Readers  will recognize that this view of the labor  market underlies the
discussion in Little and Mirrlees (1974).
4/  It should be noted that the model does not include quasi-fixed sector-
specific primary factors.  This is due to the lack of data on capital
in Bangladesh.  Thus the wage  rate actually refers to the price of
value added.
5/  See Ahmad and Stern (1984), (1987).
6/  See Hughes (1986).- 14 -
changes  depends  on the view adopted  regarding  incidence,  which latter  is
influenced by  assumptions  made about shifting.  Since tax analysts
necessarily  make such assumptions,  whether  explicitly  or otherwise,  it is
of some importance  to examine  the  sensitivity  of judgments  about  desirable
directions  of reform  to the range  of shifting  assumptions  that have been
used  in the  empirical  literature.
The Afenda
To that end, we implement the following program. First, the
revenue  and incidence  information  of Tables  1-3 is summarized  in a single
measure  that  captures  the relative  desirability  of increased  taxation  on a
particular  sector.  Second,  the underlying  elasticities  of the  model are
changed  to reproduce  the full forward  and full backward  shifting  cases.
Third, the summary measure is calculated  for each sector  for the full
forward  and full  backward  shifting  cases.  Fourth,  the change  in sectoral
rankings is examined in order to assess the sensitivity  of desirable
directions  of reform  to shifting  assumptions.
Step 1:  A Summary Measure
A change in the tax rate on any good will affect government
revenue  and, through  changes in the burden  of taxation,  the welfare of
different socioeconomic  groups.  The loss caused to the socioeconomic
groups  per  unit of revenue  raised  thus  takes  into  account  both revenue  and
incidence  effects  and provides  a natural  measure of the desirability  of
intensifying  taxation  on any particular  sector.  Of two sectors,  the one
with the lower (higher) loss per unit of revenue  is a better (worse)
candidate  for  taxation  in the  sense  that,  at the  margin,  a revenue-neutral
switch  from  the  worse  to the  better  sector  would  be  welfare-improving.- 15 -
The model is used to calculate the effect on welfare and on
revenue  of a marginal  (strictly,  infinitesmal)  increase  in the excise  tax
on each  sector,  taking  into  account  the  general  equilibrium  interactions  of
that change. The  welfare  effect  is then  divided  by the revenue  effect  to
yield  the  measure  described  above. 7
To aggregate  the  welfare  affects  across  socioeconomic  groups,  we
use  the  following  social  welfare  function.
W - E NhUh/v
h
where
Nh:  population  of socioeconomic  group  h (h - 1 ... 10)
Uh:  per  capita  utility  level  of h (h  - 1..  .10)
v :  index  of inequality  aversion  (v  - 1)
We choose  as the central  case  a value  of -5 for  v, reflecting  a degree  of
inequality  aversion  greater  than  that used in many exercises. A detailed
justification  for  choosing  such  a  value  is  provided  later  in this  section. 8
Stel  2:  Shifting  Assumptions:  Three  Cases
In order to implement  different  kinds of shifting  scenarios,  a
particular configuration  of labor supply and substitution  elasticities
among factors is chosen as a "central  case" and those parameters  then
varied to generate  two polar cases:  (1) full forward  shifting  and (ii)
7/  This is the general  equilibrium  analogue  of the measure proposed  by
Ahmad and Stern (1984),  (1987)  in evaluating  tax reform in the more
partial  context  of full  forward  shifting.
8/  Column  (7)  of Table  1  presents  the  welfare  loss  arising  from  raising  an
additional  Tk 230  million  from  each  sector. It may  be noted  that  this
is  a  discrete  rather  than  a  marginal  change.- 16 -
full backward  shifting.  These  cases,  while polar,  are not extreme:  as
mentioned  before,  both  have  featured  in  the  empirical  literature.
The "central"  case, from which the results  of Tables 1-3 were
taken,  is  defined  by labor  supply  elasticities  of 0.5  for  all  socioeconomic
groups  and a  uniform-across-sector  elasticity  of substitution  of 0.5 among
all primary  factors  in generating  value added.  Taxes are partly forward
shifted  and  partly  backward  shifted  in  this  case.
Full  forward  shifting  obtains  in the  model  when  (i)  all
elasticities  of substitution  between  factors  are set  to zero and (ii)  the
labor supply  elasticities  by socioeconomic  groups are set to infinity. 9
These assumptions  effectively  allow  the primary  factors  to be aggregated
into a  single  factor,  thus ensuring  that no unit cost increases  due to
taxation  may be shifted  back  into  reduced  factor  returns.
Full  backward  shifting  is achieved  by setting  all labor supply
elasticities  to zero.  In this case,  the supply  of labor  is constant,  and
any changes  in labor  demand  lead to changes  in the real  wage rate.  Thus,
when taxes  are increased,  the demands  for  factor  decrease,  resulting  in a
lower  real  wage  rate,  with general  equilibrium  repercussions  throughout  the
economy.
Stea  3:  The  RankinR  of Sectors
Table 4 ranks sectors  with respect  to the value of the marginal
welfare-to-revenue  ratio. As  mentioned  before,  this  has  the  interpretation
that  a revenue-neutral  switch  from  a lower-ranked  to  a higher-ranked  sector
is welfare-improving.  Before proceeding  to the results,  it should  be
observed that the welfare-to-revenue  ratios will be affected by what
assumption  is made regarding  the disposition  of the  revenue  raised  by the
9/  In fact,  to achieve  numerical  stability,  they  are  set  equal  to 20.- 17  -
government  through  taxation. The figures  reported  here are calculated  on
the assumption that the government  saves the additional  revenue raised
through  taxation,  using  it in part  to retire  foreign  debt.  An alternative
assumption,  viz., that  the government  invests  the  extra  revenue  subject  to
the current  account  deficit  in the balance  of payments  being  fixed,  makes
vary little  difference  to the rankings. These are reported  in Dahl and
Mitra  (1989).
It is apparent  from the table  that the  welfare-to-revenue  ratios
are widely dispersed across sectors.  However, it is true under all
shifting  assumptions  that  cotton  yarn,  jute  and  tobacco  are  among  the  worse
candidates for taxation.  Desirable  tax bases are rural housebuilding,
other  construction  and public  administration  and, except  for full forward
shifting where  cascading is strong, cement.  It may  be noted  that
housebuilding, construction  and cement are linked together and serve
investment  needs  (which  do not yield immediate  welfare effects in the
static  model).
A  dramatic example of the impact of shifting assumptions  on
rankings  is  provided  by the  rice  sector. This  sector  uses  a high share  of
landless in its production.  When taxes are backward shifted, incoaie
effects  are  strong  for  this group,  which is both the  poorest  group  in the
country, as well as the labor reserve  class for the rural area.  Its
ranking  however  climbs  to 2 under  full forward  shifting. This is related
to the  fact  that  the supernumerary  usage  of rice  in the linear  expenditure
system  is not  very progressive  in income,  thus  yielding  much smaller  total
distributional  and  income  effects  than  if taxes  are  backward  shifted.- 18 -
Table  4.  Bangladesh:  Rankings  by  Welfare-to-Revenue  Ratio  of  Marginal
Changes  in  Excise  Taxes  by Sector
Central  Full  Forward  Full Backward
Svector  Case  Shifting  Shifting
Rice  10  2  14
Wheal;  29  21  32
Jutoi  35  31  35
Cotton  21  25  21
Tea  12  17  )2
Other  Crops  15  11  22
Livestock  24  15  30
Fisheries  7  1  10
Forestry  13  19  13
Sugar  22  24  20
Edible  Oil  28  29  28
Tobacco  33  34  34
Other  Food  26  26  19
Cotton  Yarn  34  35  33
Cloth  17  13  25
Jute  Textiles  6  7  6
Paper  23  27  16
Leather  27  30  26
Fertilizer  14  12  18
Pharmaceuticals  & Chemicals  25  28  23
Cement  1  6  1
Basic  Metals  3  8  3
Metal  Products  9  10  8
Wood  & Other  Industries  16  18  15
Housebuilding
- Urban  8  9  7
- Rural  2  3  2
Other  Construction  4  4  4
Petroleum  20  16  24
Electricity  & Gas  19  22  17
Transport  Services  32  23  29
Housing  30  32  31
Health  18  20  11
Education  11  14  9
Public  Administration  5  5  5
Trade  & Other  31  33  27- 19  -
Another  notable,  though  less  striking  example,  is the  basic  metals
sector  which  becomes  a better  candidate  Eor  taxation  the  greater  the  degree
of backward  shifting. This occurs  because  the  sector  only  employs  higher
income  classes  (rural  and  urban  informals  and  formals). On the  other  hand,
when taxes  are fully  forward  shifted,  the  basic  metals  sector  becomes  less
attractive  since  the  prices  of  many other  using  sectors  are affected,  thus
increasing  the cost of living  for other  household  groups,  including  the
landless.
Step  4:  Sensitivity  of Rankinzs  to Shiftinx
The sensitivity  of sectoral  rankings  to shifting  assumptions  is
summarized  in the Spearman  rank  correlation  coefficients  reported  in Table
5 between  the  results  obtained  in each  case.  It is 0.79  for  two  economies
that  differ  only  with respect  to  the  production  and  labor  market  parameters
that affect  tax shifting.  This is quite a low  number,  considering  that
everything  else in  the  two  economies  is identical.
Distributional  Emphasis  an  DisaggreRation
It will  be recollected that the parameter v was  set at -5,
reflecting  a very strong  degree  of aversion  to inequality. If instead  we
choose  v = -1, it is found  that the  rankings  are  highly  correlated. From
this, it is tempting  to conclude  that  unless  inequality  ave-sion  is very
high,  it is  unnecessary  for  the  analyst  to take  a particular  view regarding
substitutability  assumptions  in production  and factor  market conditions.
However,  as argued  in Dahl and  Mitra (1989),  this  would  be a mistake,  for
the following reason.  Taxation is in practice done at a  level of
classification  that  is significantly more  disaggregated than that
represented in this model, or indeed in most workable applied  general
equilibrium  models  where  the  degree  of disaggregation  is constrained  by the
availability  of data. By taxing  different  goods  that  appear  within  the- 20 -




Full  Backward  Shifting  -
Central  Case  0.943
Full  Forward  Shifting  -
Central  Case  0.916
Full Forward Shifting - 0.785
Full  Backward  Shifting
same sector in the model at different  rates, it is possible  to target
selected households or income groups on the basis of differences  in
consumption  and employment  patterns  more effectively  than is represented
here.  Thus, the  petroleum  sector  of the Bangladesh  model includes  heavy
fuels,  light  fuels,  kerosene  and  the  like.  The  distributional
characteristics of the  groups consuming each of those products are
different,  a feature  that is obscured  in the  model by the f  act that all
users  are affected  by a tax  on petroleum. For the  same  reason,  no account
can be taken of differences  among socioeconomic  groups employed  in the
production  of different  commodities  belonging  to the  same  sector. The  need
to tax all commodities  making  up a "model"  sector  at the  same rate  may be
viewed  as  a  tax  restriction.  This  imposes a  constraint  on  the
redistribution  desired  by even a moderately  inequality-averse  government
(one  with v - -1).  To correct  for  the  fact  that  the  conduct  of tax  policy
has, in practice,  more degrees  of freedom  than  may be represented  by the
model,  it was decided,  for  modelling  purposes,  to take  a  higher  degree  of
inequality  aversion  than  that  expected  to be  characteristic of a
government.- 21
The above view about the tradeoff  between  aggregation  and the
redistributive  potential  of commodity  taxation  was  confirmed  by aggregating
the  35-sector  model  into  5 sectors  and  observing  that  the  sectoral  rankings
were almost  perfectly  correlated  even for  v - -5.  This finding  confirms
that even moderate redistributive  concerns  are enough to make shifting
assumptions  matter,  the greater  the  degree  of sectoral  disaggregation.  In
practice, the number of commodities  and sectors  is very large and the
resulting  classifications  facing  tax  policy  makers  very disaggregated,  thus
highlighting  the  need for  careful  attention  to the  underlying  determinants
of shifting  in incidence  analysis.
Implication  for  Tax  Policy  Analysis
The analysis  with the Bangladesh  tax policy  model  has shown  that
judgments  on  desirable  directions  of  tax  reform  based  on
revenue-cum-incidence  analysis  can be quite  sensitive  to the  modelling  of
the  degree of substitution among  factors in production and on  the
conditions  prevailing  in factor  markets  in the economy.1 0 Moreover,  this
conclusion  applies  to comparisons  between  different  model specifications
that,  far  from  being  extreme,  implicitly  underpin  the shifting  assumptions
actually  used in  partial  equilibrium-based  empirical  work.
Given our uncertainty about the true values of some of the
underlying  elasticities,  models  such as  the one developed  here should  be
used  to identify  revenue-raising  tax  packages  that  are  broadly  satisfactory
for plausible  rather  than polar  values of the elasticities,  an approach
implemented  in  Mitra  et.  al. (1989b).
10/  The demand  system  is kept constant  in these  experiments. Sensitivity
of the rankings  to changes  in demand  systems  is examined  in Dahl and
Mitra  (1990).- 22  -
III.  CHINA
The Problem
As in  a large  number  of other  countries,  the  value  added  tax (VAT)
is  assuming  increasing  importance  in  the  indirect  tax  system  in  China. The
VAT rates  are, however,  decided  on a product-by-product  basis  with rates
set to yield  broadly  the  same revenue  as the turnover  tax  replaced  by the
VAT, although  there are some goods,  such as textiles,  that have seen a
reduction  in their  tax  burden. This  means  that  there  is a large  number  of
VAT  rates,  as  reported  for  broad  groups  in Table  6.
Faced  with this situation,  a standard  recommendation  made by tax
analysts  is to unify the VAT rate across  all the sectors  that the tax
administration  is able to reach,  with the rate set to generate  the same
revenue as that raised before unification.11  Would such advice be
appropriate  in an  economy  such  as  China?
Institutional  Structure
To help answer this question, is it necessary to sketch the
institutional  framework  within  which  the  tax  system  is embedded.1 2 The  two
following  features  are  particularly  important.
First,  economic  reforms  in China  have led  to the introduction  of
the  so-called  dual  pricing  system  that  allows  State  enterprises  to  purchase
part of their inputs and sell part of their output  at market prices.
However,  State  enterprises  must  first  deliver  their  plan  quota  at
11/  To this  would  be added  supplementary  excises  or  a luxury  rate  of  VAT on
selected  goods  on distributional  grounds.
12/  For  a fuller  discussion,  see  Mitra,  et.  al. (1989a).- 23 -
Table  6.  China: Value  Added  Tax  Rates  on  Major  Product  Groups
Product  Group  Rate
Textiles  14Z - 23%
Clothing and footwear  14% - 20%
Enamel  products  20%
Glass and glass products  14Z - 26%
Medicines  14%
Household Machinery  14% - 43%
Electrical appliances  14% - 20%
Electronic  appliances  12%  16%
Machinery  122 - 14%
Steel  8%
Steel  products  14%
Paper  14% - 30%
Stationery  12% - 30%
Household chemicals  14% - 45%
Ceramics  12% - 30%
Processed  food  and  beverages  14%  - 30%
Leather  14% - 20%
Furniture  14%
controlled  prices  (known  as State  list  prices)  before  selling  output  on the
free  market. To allow  this,  such  enterprises  may  also  buy  inputs  necessary
to fulfill plan targets at controlled  prices. 13 The system of price
controls  is an implicit  subsidy  to users,  financed  by an implicit  tax on
producers.  Thus, for example,  price controls  on final goods subsidize
final consumers  at the expense  of consumer  goods-producing  enterprises,
while  price  controls  on intermediate  goods  boost  profitability  in  consumer
goods-producing  enterprises  at the  expense  of those  producing  intermediate
goods.1 4 Since  indirect  taxes  must  operate  within  the  overall  framework  of
13/  It is estimated,  for example,  that the proportions  of agricultural
products, consumer goods and intermediate  goods not transacted at
controlled  prices  in 1986  were 76 percent,  53 percent  and 40  percent
respectively.  See  Mitra,  et.  al. (1989a).
14/  Thus, an illustrative  calculation  suggests  that the effect of price
controls on nonagricultural  final goods is to reduce  the index of
retail  prices  by around  7  percent. See  Mitrr.,  et.  al. (1989a).- 24 -
price controls, it is necessary to view taxes and price controls as
constituting  an integrated  system.
Second,  before the economic  reforms,  State enterprises  received
all funds for expansion from the State, and, in return, remitted  all
profits to the State.  The reform process introduced  so-called  profit
responsibility,  which replaced  profit remittances  with enterprise  income
taxes.  The enterprise  was allowed  to keep its after-tax  profits  and to
eivide  them  between  three  alternative  uses:  (1)  investment  and  research  and
development;  (2)  workers'  welfare  fund;  and (3)  wage bonuses.
Controlled  prices  could  however  lead  to  highly  unequal
profitability  of enterprises  in different  industries. This  would produce
large divergence  between enterprises  in the amount  of after-tax  profits
they could  devote  to the  three  uses.  In order  to prevent  this,  commodity
taxes1 5 (which  had only been of minor significance  before  the reform)  are
set  at different  rates  for  different  industries.1 6
The  coexistence of the two  sets of prices has  significant
implications  for  tax  policy  analysis. Taxes  on controlled  price  sales  have
to be  borne  by the  enterprise  ar.d  reduce  investment,  welfare  facilities  and
bonuses.  In contrast,  taxes  on free  market  sales  can  be passed  on to the
consumer  and  only  harm  the  enterprise  through  a reduction  in  the  demand  for
its  output.
15/  Originally,  the commodity  taxes  were the  Product  Tax and the Business
Tax. These  are  both  turnover  taxes  and  are  gradually  being  replaced  by
the  Value  Added  Tax.
16/  The  use  of taxes  to equalize  profitability  could  be avoided  by setting
the controlled  prices to just cover cost (including  any taxes that
might  be desired  for  other  reasons),  and  by revising  them regularly  to
reflect cost  changes. However,  the  available  evidence  from  China,  and
other  countries  with controlled  prices,  suggests  that  this  usually  does
not  happen.- 25 -
VAT:  Simplification  or Unification?
Difficulties with  tax administration and  opportunities for
wasteful  rent-seeking  imply  that considerable  simplification  is desirable
in the structure  of VAT rates  in China.  However,  since  the existence  of
price  controls has  a  very  significant effect  on  profitability,17
unification of the VAT rate structure  without price reform would be
premature.
A tax policy  model  based  on Chinese  data  was used to explore  the
losses that would  arise from unifying VAT rates in the presence of
controlled  prices  for plan transactions  and free  market  prices  for other
transactions.1 8 The  model  distinguishes  twenty-four  production  sectors  and
assumes  that inequality  arises  from differences  in workers  bonuses  caused
by backward shifting of taxes on that portion of sales occurring at
controlled  prices.19
17/  Some  estimates  are  provided  in  Mitra  et.  al (1989!.
18/  For  a fuller  exposition  and  other  details,  see  Heady  and  Mitra (1990a).
It should  be noted  that  the  input  output  table  used in  this  exercise  is
for  1981  ana  is  therefore  somewhat  out  of date. While  this  affects  the
numbers in Table 7, it does not affect  the basic argument  of this
section.
19/  This assumption is made to provide income inequality  as a simple
representation  of the harm caused by unequal profitability.  If,
instead, unequal  profits produced  unequal investment, long-run
inefficiency  might  result.  However,  given  the  increasing
liberalization  of capital  markets in China,  debt financing  might be
used as an alternative  to retail profits.  In this case, unequal
profitability  will not produce  unequal  investment,  but the allocation
of current  profits  to investment  will reduce  future  interest  payments
on debt and  lead to larger future bonuses.  Thus,  all profits
eventually  benefit  workers  through  bonuses  or the size of the  workers
welfare  funds.- 26 -
Table 7.  Welfare Losses (in GDP Equivalents) from Uniform Taxation
and from Planning Logarithmic Social  Welfare Function (c  =  0)
No Plan  1/4  Plan  1/2  Plan  3/4 Plan  Full Plan a/
(a)  (b)
Welfare loss from
uniform taxes  0  0.8%  3.7%  8.6%  15.4%
Welfare loss from
planning  0  1.2%  2.7%  3.8%  4.6%  5.9%
a/  The  results  in  column  (a)  are  calculated  on  the  assumption  that
enterprises can make  up short output by purchasing on the free market.
The results in column (b) rule out this practice.  There is no welfare
loss  from  uniform  taxes  in column  (b) because  uniform taxes  and  full
planning are inconsistent  with market clearance.
Table  7  demonstrates  the  welfare  losses  (measured  in  GDP
equivalents) (i) from imposing uniform taxes in a semi-planned economy and
(ii) from planning.  The loss is measured as the percentage reduction in
income that  would have produced the same reduction in social  welfare.  The
social welfare  function used  in the calculation is, as before, of  the
form:
W =  E NhUh/  v
h
where  Nh:  employment in industry  h
Uh:  utility function of a worker in industry  h
v:  index of inequality  aversion. (v  4  1)
We take v =  0, whence the above reduces to
W - E  Nh log  Uh
h
The first column gives the results when there is no planning, as
a  benchmark  for  comparison.  With  an  assumed inelastic labor  suppiy,
uniform taxes are optimal in this case-  The second column presents the
results  where, for each sector, the planned inputs and planned outputs are- 27 -
equal to one quarter of their 1981  values and plan prices are the same as
in  1981.  The  remaining  columns  correspond  to  increasing  the  plan
quantities, always as a uniform proportion of the 1981 inputs and outputs.
At  all levels of planning up to and including 3/4, sectors all produced
more than the plan quantities.  However, when  planning was increased to
cover the whole  of the 1981 inputs and outputs, some sectors wished to
produce more and some less.20 There were then two assumptions that could
be made:  (a) that  enterprises  could  produce  less  than the plan  and
purchase the difference at free  market prices, 21 or (b)  enterprises had to
adhere strictly to the plan, and so there was no production for the free
market.  Columns  (a) and  (b) under "Full Plan" correspond to those two
alternatives.
Inspection of Table 7 shows that the loss from uniform taxation
increases rapidly with the extent of planning.  In other words the degree
of differential taxation increases  with planning.  The reason for this is
that planning introduces inequality in profits and bonuses, and so some of
the  efficiency  in the goods market must  be  given up  to  reduce income
inequality.  In the final column, there is no efficiency reason affecting
tax setting because output is fixed at the plan levels.  In this case,
taxes are being used entirely to equalize profitability between sectors.
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  losses  from  uniform  taxation  are  large
compared to  losses computed in free market  economies. 22 Table 7 shows
that even the planning of only a quarter of output produces significant
20/ They could not all produce more because the labor constraint was  set
equal to the 1981 labor use.
21/ In that case some goods would be counted twice in the plan:  once wheii
originally produced, and again when  bought by another enterprise and(
sold to the planning authority.
22/ See, for example, Ebrahimi and Heady (1988).- 28 -
losses  from uniformity,  a result  that continues  to be true  with a more
modest  degree  of inequality  aversion  such  as e  - 0.5.23
Finally,  as planning  is a distortion  in this particular  model,
the  welfare  loss  arising  from  this  source  goes  up  with its  extent,  as seen
in  Table  7.
While the losses  from imposing  uniformity  are substantial,  it
would  be inappropriate  to  recommend,  for  example,  that  any  country  adopt  a
VAT with many different  rates,  given  administrative  costs and attendant
opportunities  for  tax  fraud  and  rent  seeking. Instead,  the  results  should
be seen as providing strong  evidence  that considerable  welfare losses
could  occur  if  tax  rates  were equalized  before  substantial  price  reform  is
undertaken, a result that is reflected in the more institutionally-
oriented  discussion  in Mitra, et. al. (1989a).  A  sensible  compromise
between the stark simplicity  of the model and the reality  of the tax
system  might be to divide  goods  into  perhaps  three  groups  with a "low",
"standard"  and  "high"  rate  of VAT.  Other  simulations  with the  model  show
that  the introduction  of three  groups  with separate  tax  rates  captures  at
least  two  thirds  of the  gains  that  would  be  made in  moving  from  uniform  to
sectorally  differentiated  taxation. 24
Tax  Reform  and  Price  Reform
Given the practical difficulties of administering  a highly
differentiated  tax system, the numbers presented  here may be seen as
providing  a measure  of the  desirability  of price  reform. More generally,
the  framework  helps  illuminate  the  importance  of seeing  the  tax  system  and
its reform in the context of other reforms  and of making clear that
23/  See  Heady  and  Mitra  (1990a).
24/  See  Heady  and  Mitra  (1990b).- 29  -
recommendations  on  tax  policy  necessarily  depend  on what is assumed  about
other  policy  changes  in  the  economy.
IV.  INDIA
The  Problem
The move towards  an outward-oriented  development  strategy,  with
its attendant benefits, requires lowering tariffs and quantitative
restrictions  on trade. However,  many  developing  countries  rely  on tariffs
to a significant  extent  to  raise  public  revenue. 25 Thus,  while  conversion
of quantitative  restrictions  into tariff  equivalents  would be revenue-
raising, the reduction of tariffs could be expected to be revenue-
reducing.  In what follows,  we draw on preliminary  findings  from an
ongoing  study to examine  the kinds of fiscal  adjustments  that  would be
required  to offset tariff  reductions  in India, a country  where import
duties  as a proportion  of imports  were 632  in 1987/88.26
In common  with many other countries,  tariffs  in India  comprise
(i)  a  protective  element  (known  as  basic  and  auxiliary  customs  duties)  and
(i') a purely revenue-raising element (known as the additional or
countervailing  customs  duty,  CVD) that matches  the domestic  excise  tax.
25/  The World Development  Report 1988  estimates  that the contribution  of
import  taxes  to public  revenue  is over  20Z  in  Asia,  sub-Saharan  Africa
and in the Middle East and North Africa compared to 22 in the
industrial  countries.
26/  See Mitra and Go  (1990).  The effect  of relaxing  nontariff  import
licensing  will also  be the  subject  of that  study. Available  evidence,
quoted  in Kishor  (1989), suggests  that the  premium  on  import
replenishment  licenses  given  to exporters  had fallen  to around  52 in
the  1980s,  largely  due  to a shift  to a  more active  exchange  rate  policy
and increased  tariffs  on imports.  However,  such licenses  cannot  be
used  to import  goods  on the  so-called  restricted  list.- 30 -
The CVD and the central excise tax are subject to the modified value added
tax (MODVAT).  Table 8 reports the contribution of the various taxes to
the revenue of the Union  (the Central government) and that of the Union
and States.
The table shows that protective customs duties account for a high
proportion - 31Z of Union revenues.  Hence reduction of those duties may
be expected to have a significant impact on the public finances and would
require offsetting policies, most likely  with respect to excise taxes-cum-
CVD.27 Assessing  those  budgetary  consequences  and  estimating  the
magnitude  of  those  changes  require  a  framework  that  incorporates the
appropriate economywide linkages.  On the other hand, the categories used
in  tariff  reform analysis are  sectorally disaggregated, so that  it  is
necessary also to ascertain how the economywide changes traced above would
affect, for example, various subsectors within the manufacturing sector.
These objectives are reconciled by  implementing two models  on a  common
(1987/88) data base:  (1) a 72-sector disaggregated version  that makes
simple assumptions regarding certain economywide relationships and (ii)  an
aggregated 6-sector version that makes more appropriate assumptions about
those  relationships and  suggests what  correction ought  therefore to be
made to the results of the sectorally  detailed analysis.
This approach can be used as follows.  The disaggregated model
assumes, for ease of  computation, that the real returns to primary factors
such as capital and various types of labor are fixed at their base year
levels or, equivalently, that the factors are in perfectly elastic supply
at those real factor prices.  These factors  combine with
27/ It is important that the adjustment be made to both the excise as well
as the CVD which matches the excise tax.  The argument is spelled out
in Mitra (1990).- 31 -
Table  8:  India: Composition  of Indirect  Tax  Revenue  a/ 1987-88
Imported  Domestic
Goods  Goods  Total
A.  Union
Protective  Import  Duty  31.23  31.23
Countervailing  Import  Duty  4.10  4.10
Union Excise Tax  - 43.64  43.64
Total  35.33  43.64  78.97
B.  Union  and  States
Protective  Import  Duty  23.57  23.57
Countervailing  Import  Duty  2.74  2.74
Union  Excise  Tax  29.11  29.11
State  Excise  Tax  4.61  4.61
State  Sales  Tax  a/  0.84  18.59  19.43
Total  27.15  52.31  79.46
a/  Figures  are  percent  of total  tax  revenue.
intermediate  inputs,  both  domestic  and  imported,  to  produce  domestic
output.  The latter, in turn, is subject  to import  competition  under
various licensing arrangements  for certain  kinds of intermediates  and
capital  goods  and,  reflecting  the  Indian  situation,  to no such  competition
for  consumer  goods. Incomes  are  paid  to a single  average  rural  and  single
average urban household and are then divided between consumption  and
savings.  Exports depend on the ratio of export prices to those of
substitutes  in international  markets  as  well as income  in the rest  of the
world.  The  government  collects  tariff  and  tax  revenue  from  intermediates,
capital  and  final  goods  and  spends  on  public  consumption:  the  difference
is public  savings  which,  together  with private  savings  and  the excess  of
imports  over  exports  (or,  foreign  savings)  finances  investment. 28
28/  For  details,  see  Mitra  and  Go (1990).- 32 -
The Indian economy is characterized  by a budget deficit of around
102 of GDP and a current account deficit of over 3% of GDP.  To calculate
the magnitude of the adjustments required to support tariff reform, the
model is asked the question: by how much do excise taxes and CVDs  need on
average  to  be  increased  for  a  given  across-the-board  reduction  in
protective customs duties, so as to allow the government to finance its
expenditures  without any change in the trade deficit? 29
The Agenda
The question  is answered in the following stages.  First,  the
required average increase in taxes is calculated in the 72-sector model
under the assumption that real returns to factors are held  constant at
their 1987/88 values.  Second, the responsiveness of the required average
increase in  taxes to  changes  in the  real factor prices is calculated,
again in the 72-sector model.  Third, the 6-sector model, with  flexible
real factor prices, is used to determine the impact of an across-the-board
cut  in  protective  tariffs  on  the  real  returns  to  labor  and  capital.
Finally,  the  change  in  factor  prices  (step 3)  is multiplied  by  the
responsiveness to factor prices (Step 2) to adjust the estimates in step
1.
Step 1:  Required Tax Change:  Disazzregated  Model
The macroeconomic  effects of  an across-the-board reduction  in
protective  customs  duties  are  as  follows.  Investment  and  government
expenditures are helo constant in real terms, so that the behavior of the
model will be seen to exhibit certain "Keynesian" features.  A decrease in
29/ The increase in excise taxes is confined to the nonagricultural sector,
as the contribution of agriculture to excise tax revenue is only 0.03%.- 33 -
tariffs has a negative  effect on public  revenue  and, since government
consumption  is fixed in real terms,  on public  savings.  However,  given
that around 60% of imports are inputs into the production  process,  a
tariff  reduction  has a favorable  effect  on output,  private  sector  incomes
and hence,  private  savings.  But since  only a fraction  of extra  private
sector income  finds its way into private savings,  the increase  in the
latter  is less than the decline  in public  savings.  With a given  trade
deficit (foreign  savings), total savings in the economy decline and
notwithstanding  the tariff reduction-induced  fall in investment  goods
prices,  are  not  sufficient  to  finance  investment  expenditures.  Since  with
fixed expenditures,  the government  saves  all additional  income,  whereas
the private sector  saves only part of its additional  income,  domestic
savings  may be increased  by transferring  income  to the public  sector  by
increasing  excise taxes-cum-CVD. With real returns  to primary  factors
fixed,  it is estimated  in the 72-sector  model that  a 1Z across-the-board
cut in protective tariffs  would call for an 0.48% increase  in excise
taxes-cum-CVD.
It  may be noted  from  Table  8 that excises  and  CVD accounted  for
48%  of Union  revenues  in 1987/88  or,  roughly  one-and-a-half  times  as  much
as  protective  duties. Hence,  it  would  have  been  tempting  to conclude  that
an approximately  0.67%  increase  in  excise  taxes-cum-CVD  would  be necessary
to offset the impact  of a 1% reduction  in protective  tariffs.  This,
however,  takes  no account  of the  fact that  the fall in prices  induced  by
the tariff cuts reduces the cost of government  expenditure  and hence
requires  less  revenue  to  be raised.
The tariff reduction-cum-tax  increase  with an unchanged  trade
deficit  leads  to an 0.14%  increase  in total  imports  and  an 0.19%  increase
in  exports.- 34  -
Step 2:  Responsiveness to Factor Prices:  Disaggregated  Model
An increase in real factor prices, by boosting aggregate demand,
has an expansionary impact on the private economy, with a positive effect
on  income, consumption a-id  savings.  While  this increases the value of
fixed investment expenditures, the rise in private savings is larger and,
using  the  arguments developed above, requires a  reduction in  taxes to
transfer income tz  the government.  It is calculated that the adjustment
required in excise taxes-cum-CVD as a result of a 1% average increase in
nonagricultural real wages  and a 1% average increase in nonagricultural
real returns to capital is negative and equals -6.4% and -2% respectively.
Step 3:  The Effect on Factor Prices:  Aggregated Model
The  aggregated  model  maps  the  72  sectors  into 6  sectors but
allows  factor  prices  to  be  determined  endogenously.  Labor  is mobile
across sectors and is supplied with an elasticity of  1.2, except, as in
the Bangladesh model of Section II, for the residual labor classes in the
rural  and urban  areas.  There is  a bigger change  in the treatment of
capital, which is taken to be sector specific, so that its rate of return
is  residually  determined,  an  assumption  polar  to  that  made  in  the
72-sector model.  A cut in protective tariffs has been argued before to be
expansionary, so that the pull of demand raises real factor prices.  Since
capital is supplied inelastically in each sector, its average real return
is bid up  to a  greater extent.  The  aggregated model  shows that  a 1%
across-the-board  cut  in protective  tariffs has  a  negligible  impact on
nonagricultural real wages while raising nonagricultural real returns to
capital on average by 0.09%.
Step 4:  Required Correction to the Disaggregated  Model
The previous two sets of calculations may now be put together to
determine the correction required in the 72-sector  model on account of the- 35  -
assumption of constant real factor prices.  The change in both sets of
factor prices yielded by the 6 sector model, as a result of a 1% across-
the-board  reduction  in protective  tariffs  (step 3), multiplied  by  the
responsiveness  of  the  adjustment  factor  for  excise  taxes-cum-CVD  to
changes in those factor prices (step 2), shows that the latter adjustment
factor falls by roughly 0.2% for a  1% reduction in protective tariffs.
This  should  be  subtracted from the  figure of 0.48%  arrived at  in  the
72-sector model with constant factor prices to yield 0.28% as the average
adjustment factor.
Summarv
The  two  models  together  therefore  show  that  the  order  of
magnitude of the average upward adjustment to excises-cum-CVD varies from
0.28%  to  0.48% in  response to a  1% across-the-board cut  in protective
tariffs  depending  on what  assumption  is made  about  the elasticity of
supply of capital to each sector.  To recapitulate, the tariff cut raises
real factor returns; the greater the effect on factor prices, the less the
savings - investment gap that needs to be made up by increasing taxes.
V.  IMPLEMENTING TAX POLICY MODELS
The models  presented  above  have  been  shown  to be  capable of
addressing a broad range of questions in a consistent  way.  These benefits
must  of  course be placed  against the costs that are incurred in their
construction.  This section describes some of those costs and concludes
with an overall assessment. 30
30/ For  a detailed account of how  a model  can be  implemented, see Dahl
(1987),  which  reviews  the  necessary  steps  in  the  context  of  a
particular model.- 36 -
The  costs  of  building  and  running  a general  equilibrium  model  for
tax policy analysis may usefully be assessed by considering the phases of
a model's "life cycle".  Although the phases are not disjoint, the
following  breakdown  is convenient  for our purposes:  (1) selection  of
model  structure,  (2)  compilation  of  a  raw  data  base,  (3)  model
implementation,  (4) generation  of  a  consistent  data  base,  (5) model
calibration and (6)  experimentation  with the model.
Selection of Model Structure
The formulation of the problem at hand determines the structure
of the model in a straightforward  way.  For instance, the evaluation of
excise taxes requires a fairly disaggregated description of the production
structure, while income tax enalysis may call for closer attention to be
paid to income generation, transfer incomes and the determinants of factor
supplies an('  demands.  Studies of trade taxation naturally  call for  a
detailed description of foreign trade.
Compilation of a Raw Data Base
The structure  of the  model makes clear  what data are required,
whence the compilation  of a raw data base may begin.  This is a time
consuming  task. A typical  model  requires  statistics  on  production,  factor
employment and income, demand patterns, foreign trade, government revenue
and  expenditure.  The  data  comes  from  diverse  sources. National  accounts,
aggregate  foreign  trade  statistics  and  government  revenues  and
expenditures are usually easily obtained.  An increasing number of
countries  have household  expenditure  surveys  and many have input-output
tables  that  can  be updated  using  other  information.  Employment  and  income
statistics  are  harder  to obtain,  especially  when sectorally  disaggregated
information  is  needed. In particular,  it is normally  not  possible  to get- 37 -
reliable  estimates  of  land  use  and  capital  stocks  which  must  be
"guesstimated,"  for  example,  by  postulating  plausible  capital-output
ratios.  While  it would clearly be desirable to collect time series of
such data in order to get parameter estimates for use in the model, it is
generally the case that the most important pieces of information are only
available for at most only a few years.
Model Implementation
Once a  raw data base has been put together, it becomes - ssible
to decide on the size and structure of the model to be implemented.  This
will  typically  represent  a  compromise  between  the  desired  level  of
sophistication as chosen in the first step above and data availability.
Till  only  a  few  years  ago, model  implementation was  a major
activity  which required a great deal of knowledge of computer programming,
data base organization, and solution algorithms.  The advent of modeling
languages  has  changed  this  significantly.  Today  it  is  a  rather
straightforward  matter to translate formal mathematical relationships into
computer statements.  For instance,  the General  Algebraic Modeling System,
GAMS,  in which  all  three models  of  this paper have been  implemented,
allows the user to input a model in virtually the same way  as he would
write  it mathematically.  A  compact algebraic notation also means  that
formally  similar  equations  for  different  se'.ztors  can  be written  as  a
single statement.  This implies, for example, that even models as large as
the one for Bangladesh which contains around 2500 equations and variables
can be written  in less than  two pages.  They may  also be  solved on  a
portable PC 386.  The modeling languages have, furthermore, made possible
a  separation  of model  formulation and solution algorithm, a  fact  that
makes it easy to alter the formulation  without the modeler having to make
corresponding changes to several thousand lines of solver code.- 38 -
In addition, there are several prototypical  models available
today,  which  may  be used  as a template  for  the  formulation  of new  models.
Although  each  model  must focus  on the  specific  issues  that it is designed
to illuminate,  most models share accounting  identities  and equilibrium
conditions which  may  be  taken  over without much  editing.  These
developments  make it possible for the modeler to concentrate  on the
important  tasks of describing  behavior  and the particular  institutional
structure  of the  economy.
Generation  of a Consistent  Data  Base
Model implementation  makes clear in which format  data will be
used. The  next  step  is to  work through  the  raw  data  base  to  produce  a set
of data  that  is specific  to the  model  and  consistent  with its  framework.
This is a major  task.  The raw data  base  will typically  contain
some  data for  one  year and  other  pieces  of information  for  another  year.
Sector and commodity groupings tend to differ among the input-output
table, the household  expenditure  survey,  and foreign trade statistics.
Different  data sources  often  use different  definitions  for  households  and
labor  groups.  These  nbed to be brought  together  to produce  data for a
base year (and preferably for more years)  with common definitions  of
sectors, commodities,  labor categories,  households  and other entities
identified  by the  model.
Once data have been adjusted  to match common  definitions  it is
usually  found that different  pieces  of data are mutually  inconsistent.
For  instance,  supplies  and  demands  do  not  match  for  a  given  sector,  _r -he
savings-investment  identity does not hold.  Since general equilibrium
mouels must account for all flows in a consistent  manner, it becomes
necessary to adjust parts of the data to produce a balanced set of
numbers.  Although  algorithms  (such  as the RAS) are available  for this- 39 -
purpose and are easily implemented on a spreadsheet or in a programming
language, they tend to give equal credibility to all data entries and are
therefore too mechanical  to produce  sensible results.  It  is therefore
essential that modelers  identify the relatively more  and  less reliable
parts of the data base so as to be able to decide what to adjust and  what
to keep unchanged.
Model Calibration
With  the  model-specific  data  base  in place,  calibration  can
begin.  The purpose is to produce a set of parameters that will make the
model  reproduce  the  base  year,  and make  it possible  to track  actual
economic performance over several years.  While existing procedures allow
for considerable automation, the time consuming part of the exercise is to
ensure that the calibration assumptions are chosen appropriately, i.e., in
a way  that allows the behavior of the model to be consistent witb what
good  economic  analysis  would  lead  one  to  expect.  Since  general
equilibrium models embody simultaneous interactions, this requires a deep
degree of understanding of the structure and properties of the  model.
Experimentation  with the Model
Running experiments with  the model,  once  it has  been  sensibly
calibrated, is not usually very difficult or time consuming.  The reason
is partly  that existing modeling  languages allow  for parameters to  be
changed readily for counterfactual  what-if analysis, in addition to  making
it fairly simple to change behavioral assumptions.
Equally  important  from  the  point  of view  of  the  experiments
reported earlier in this paper, some modeling systems such as GAMS allow
optimization  to  be  done  on  the model.  This has  two  important uses.
First,  it  enables  optimal  policies to be  calculated, as  in  the China
model, and permits comparison of optimal policies  with other alternatives,- 40 -
such as the uniform  value added tax.  Second,  the optimization  feature
makes  it possible  to  find  general  equilibrium  multipliers  and
el-sticities.  The reason  is that  even  while  solving  a  model  with as many
unknowns  as equations,  and thus  involving  no optimization,  as is the case
with the Bangladesh and India  models, the algorithm  calculates  shadow
prices  on all  constraints  in the  model.  Thus,  for  example,  some  of these
constraints  could be that various  excise  tax rates are fixed at their
current  values. If the  objective  function  provided  to GAMS is the  social
welfare  function,  the  shadow  price  on  a  tax  constraint  has  the
interpretation  of being  the  welfare  cost  of changing  that  tax instrument,
allowing for all other changes that would occur to preserve general
equilibrium.  These  features  have  been  extensively  used  in the  experiments
reported  earlier  with the  Bangladesh  and  India  models.
Overall  Assessment
Much though not all the data that needs to be collected  for
general  equilibrium  tax policy  models is often  put together  anyway  for
various  other  purposes  in country  economic  and sector  work.  The  use of a
model  can impose  some  discipline  on what needs  to be done.  In addition,
however,  very substantial  effort  must be devoted  both to making  the deta
base  consistent  as  well  as to calibrating  the  model  in  ways that  make its
behavior  accord  with  more  a priori  views  of the  functioning  of the  economy
which it purports  to represent.  This has two important  implications.
First, it requires  that modelers  be familiar  with the way in which the
data are  put together,  so that  they  may  make informed  judgments  about  the
relative  strengths  and  weaknesses  of the different  pieces  of information
in generating a consistent data base.  Second, it  requires  that the
analyst  understand  the behavior  of his (or  her) own model very well so
that judicious  decisions  are made with respect  to calibration. Lack of
such understanding  will also prevent the analyst from explaining  why- 41 -
results  from  policy  simulations  come  out  the  way  they  do.  Since  knowledge
of the data and the model do not, unlike solution algorithms,  lend
themselves  readily  to automation,  the model will ultimately  only be as
good  as the  people  available  to  work  on it.
The examples  of the paper  indicate  what kind of benefits  may be
derived  from  modelling  exercises. First,  they  allow  an extensive  range  of
questions to be addressed.  Examples  provided here included  detailed
assessments  of tax proposals,  the sensitivity  of revenue-cum-incidence
analysis to assumptions  about production structures  and labor market
specifications,  the appropriate  design  of tax policy  in the  presence  of
dual pricing  and the coordinated  reform  of tariffs  and indirect  taxes.
These examples are clearly not meant to be exhaustive  and many more
questions  could  be analyzed  using  these  approaches. Second,  the  range  of
results  available  are  an useful  input  into  sectoral  and  project  decision-
making outside the immediate  context  of tax policy.  Thus, to give an
example,  raising  Tk. 1 in Bangladesh  of revenue  through  excise  taxation
imposes  an additional  economic  cost over  and above  the  revenue  raised  of
between  Tk. 1  and Tk. 2, depending  on the  particular  tax that  is raised.
This information  proved  useful in assessing  the costs and benefits  of
levying  tolls  as opposed  to raising  revenue  through  taxation  in financing
certain  transport  projects. Third,  existing  modelling  languages  allow  the
entire  operation  to be well-documented,  thereby  allowing  results to be
replicated  by other  policy  analysts.
In conclusion,  it may be noted  that the average  fixed  costs  of
constructing  tax  policy  models  are  lowered  and  the  exercise  rendered  more
cost-effective,  if the models  are used on a continuing  basis  for policy
analysis  rather  than if they  are "one-off"  efforts. Thus,  the  Bangladesh
model,  in  addition  to  being  used  for  tax  policy  analysis  in the  Bank's  tax-42  -
study, has been  transferred, at the country's request, to the National
Board of Revenue.  The China model, in addition to being used for tax
analysis, will  be  extended  in an ongoing  study on price  reform.  The
developmer.t  of the India model is at  an early stage compared to the other
two, but is expected to be adapted for an investigation into related sets
of issues.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper has described three sets of applications of tax policy
models developed by the World Bank's Public Economics Division during the
course of economic work on Bangladesh, China and India.
The Bangladesh model was used to highlight the role of shifting
assumptions  in  influencing  the  relative  attractiveness  of  different
options for raising revenue.  To that end, revenue and incidence effects
of  tax  changes  were  combined and  summarized in a  single measure  that
allowed different sectors to be ranked  with respect to the efficiency-cum-
equity  cost  of  raising  revenue.  Those  rankings were  used  to  compare
traditional  versus  general  equilibrium  based  approaches  to  incidence
analysis.  This  was done by ascertaining  what would happen to the rankings
first if, as is common in partial equilibrium incidence analysis, it were
assumed that all tax increases would be fully forward shifted into user
prices, and if second, as is sometimes the case in partial equilibrium
analysis, it were assumed that all tax increases  would be fully backward
shifted  into  factor  returns.  Incidence  judgments  were  more  heavily
influenced in the first case by the characteristics of the socioeconomic
groups that consume the product on which the tax is to be increased and in
the  second  case  by  the  characteristics  of  those  employed  in  its
production.  The change in the rankings in the three cases:  full forward
shifting, full backward shifting and the "central" case of a combination- 43 -
of forward and backward shifting of taxes  was considerable, a finding that
underlined  the  critical  importance  of  labor market  specifications and
substitutability assumptions in production in arriving at judgments about
tax  policy  proposals.  Attention  was  drawn  to  the  importance  of
identifying  revenue-raising packages  that are broadly  satisfactory for
plausible rather than polar values of the underlying elasticities.
The China model examined the desirability of recommending broad
uniformity of tax rates over a large  number of sectors.  While such a rule
of thumb leads to generally acceptable outcomes in market-based economies,
it  requires  substantial  re-examination  in  a  decentralizing  socialist
economy such as China, where  some production is centrally planned, and
subject to price controls, and some is subject to decentralized decision-
making and transacted at market prices.  Taxes on controlled price sales
have  to  be  borne  by  the  enterprise  and  reduce  investment,  welfare
facilities and bonuses.  In contrast, taxes on free market sales can be
passed on to the consumer and only harm the enterprise through a reduction
in the  demand for  its output.  The  coexistence of forward shifting of
taxes  on market  sales  and backward  shifting on price-controlled sales
smakes  significant  non-uniformity  of  tax  rates  desirable;  this  is
because, with price controls, backward shifting would  cause uniform tax
rates to lead to highly unequal profitability and workers' bonuses across
sectors.  The model showed not only that the losses from uniform taxation
increase rapidly with  the extent of price controls but also that those
losses  are  much  larger  than  those  computed  in economies without  such
controls.  This implies that  while simplification of rates is desirable on
administrative  grounds  and  to reduce opportunities for rent seeking, a
unification of value added tax rates is not appropriate in the presence of
price controls.  More generally, the exercise underlined the importance of- 44 -
viewing  the tax system  and its  reform  in the context  of reforms  in other
areas  of the  economy.
The ,ndia  model focussed  on aspects  of the relationship  between
trade  liberalization  undertaken  to reduce  anti-export  bias  and tax  reform
viz., the need for tax increases to offset potential revenue losses
arising  from reduction  of tariffs  in an economy  where the latter  make a
substantial  contribution  to public revenue.  This was done using two
models implemented  on a common  data base:  (1) a disaggregated  version
that  made simple  assumptions  regarding  certain  economywide  relationships
in order to focus on the consequences  of tariff reform for various
subsectors, and  (2) an aggregated model that made more appropriate
assumptions  about  those  relationships  and  suggested  what corrections  ought
therefore  be made to the results of the sectorally  detailed  analysis.
Together  the models  were able to illustrate  by how much indirect  taxes
need on average to be increased following a reduction in protective
customs  duties,  so as to allow  the government  to meet its expenditures
without  any  change in the current account deficit.  The required
adjustment in taxes was  shown to be quite different from what an
inspection  of the shares  of taxes and tariffs  in public  revenue alone
might have suggested.  The difference  was due to the fact that price
decreases  induced  by tariff  reductions  led to a fall in the  value  of the
same  real  expenditures  and  hence  reduced  the  amount  of revenue  that  needed
to  be raised.
Finally,  the paper briefly  described  the costs  of constructing
tax  policy  models  with respect  to data  requirements,  demands  on computing
and judgments  regarding  model structure  and calibration. It was argued
that the two most important  and time-consuming  elements  arose from the- 45 -
need to generate  a consistent  data  base and to calibrating  the  model in
ways that made its behavior accord  with more a 2riori views of the
functioning  of the economy  which it purported  to represent. The former
requires  knowledge  of the relatively  more and less  reliable  parts  of the
data base while  the  latter requires the analyst to understand the
structure  of the  model  so  as  to  be able  to explain  why results  from  policy
simulations come out the  way they do.  These costs must be weighed against
the fact that the models are capable,  -s shown in this paper, of
addressing  an  extensive  range  of  questions,  and  of  doing  so  in  a
consistent and potentially replicable way.  Moreover, some of the results
generated  are  moreover  useful  in  sectoral  and  project  analysis  that
transcends  the immediate  context  of tax policy. The average  fixed  costs
of constructing  tax  policy  models  are  seen,  not  just  as "one-off"  efforts,
but as  tools  for  use on  a continuing  basis  for  policy  analysis.- 46 -
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